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Keep Your Program Out of My Game: The Ninth
Circuit’s Convoluted Copyright Analysis in MDY
Industries, Inc. v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc.
I. INTRODUCTION
World of Warcraft (“WoW”), a popular online game, boasts over
twelve million users1 and generates more than $1.5 billion annually.2
Blizzard Entertainment, the company that runs WoW, claims in its
end user license agreement (“EULA”) to grant purchasers “a
limited, non-exclusive license” to install and use the game subject to
numerous restrictions.3 Besides retaining the ability to terminate the
license agreement at will, Blizzard also requires users to agree that
any violation of the restrictions on the license agreement constitutes
“an infringement of Blizzard’s copyrights in and to the Game.”4
Under U.S. copyright law, the penalty for copyright infringement
can be steep: statutory damages of up to $150,000 for willful
infringements, or actual damages if they can be proved.5
With so much risk for so many users, it is critical that courts craft
copyright law to account for the realities of the marketplace and the
protection of consumers. Additionally, courts should be sensitive to
the interests of others trying to lawfully create products that
integrate into other digitally based products, such as online games,
especially when those integrations do not harm demand for the
original product. Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit has taken a
different approach in MDY Industries, Inc. v. Blizzard
Entertainment, Inc.6 In that case, the court provided only
1. Press Release, Blizzard Entm’t, World of Warcraft Subscriber Base Reaches 12
Million Worldwide (Oct. 7, 2010), available at http://us.blizzard.com/enus/company/press/pressreleases.html?id=2847881.
2. MDY Indus., Inc. v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 2d 958, 962 (D. Ariz.
2009), vacated, 629 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2010), amended by 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 3428 (9th
Cir. 2011).
3. World of Warcraft End User License Agreement, BLIZZARD ENTM’T,
http://us.blizzard.com/en-us/company/legal/wow_eula.html (last updated Oct. 29, 2010).
4. Id.
5. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006).
6. 629 F.3d at 935. In the order amending the court’s original opinion, the Ninth
Circuit denied a rehearing and added a footnote to clarify that the court did not decide
whether a statutory provision, DMCA § 1201(f), applied because the argument was not raised
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incomplete protection for consumers and severely punished MDY
Industries for providing a product to consumers that arguably added
value to WoW without detracting from its demand.
This Note argues that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in MDY is
erroneous for several reasons. First, the court followed an
ownership/licensing distinction for software that undermines the
“first sale” doctrine, is strongly in favor of copyright holders, and
conflicts with consumer perceptions. Second, the court applied a
misguided test to determine whether violating a license provision
constitutes copyright infringement based on a distinction between
covenants and conditions. Third, the court needlessly created a
circuit split to hold MDY liable under the DMCA anticircumvention provisions where MDY was not liable for copyright
infringement.
Part II provides the facts and procedural history of MDY. Part
III summarizes the three main holdings of the Ninth Circuit’s
decision. Part IV analyzes each of the court’s holdings,
demonstrating the errors in the court’s logic and policy judgments.
Part V offers a brief conclusion.

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Blizzard Entertainment is the creator of the massively multiplayer
online role-playing game (“MMORPG”), World of Warcraft. In this
game, “players control their ‘avatar’ characters within a virtual
universe, exploring the landscape, fighting monsters, performing
quests, building skills, and interacting with other players and
computer-generated characters.”7 As characters perform these tasks,
they gain experience and advance levels.8 In March 2005, Michael
Donnelly, owner of MDY Industries, developed a software program
that would automatically simulate play for some of the lower levels of
WoW.9 Donnelly originally designed his software, known as Glider,
for personal use, but later began selling the program to other WoW
users through MDY’s website.10
to the district court or presented in the parties’ appellate briefs. 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 3428,
at *27 n.19. All other aspects of the court’s original opinion remained unchanged by the
amending order.
7. MDY, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 962.
8. Id.
9. MDY, 629 F.3d at 935.
10. Id. at 935–36.
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However, to play WoW, Blizzard requires that a player read and
accept two separate agreements.11 When installing the game client on
a computer and first running WoW, the user must agree to Blizzard’s
EULA.12 When connecting to Blizzard’s online service to play the
game, the user must accept Blizzard’s Terms of Use (“ToU”).13 At
the time that Donnelly began marketing Glider, he reviewed both
documents and concluded that bots (software, such as Glider, that
automates game play) were not prohibited.14 However, later that
year, Blizzard launched a technology known as Warden, which was
“developed to prevent [] players who use unauthorized third-party
software, including bots, from connecting to WoW’s servers.”15 At
the time of its launch, Warden was capable of detecting Glider, and
Blizzard used the technology to ban most Glider users.16 In
response, MDY modified Glider to be more difficult for Warden to
detect and continued to market the product to WoW users.17 MDY
also “modified its website to indicate that using Glider violated
Blizzard’s ToU.”18
Following Glider’s modifications, Blizzard responded to MDY
with a cease-and-desist letter, alleging that players’ use of Glider
infringed Blizzard’s copyrights.19 When MDY refused to remove
Glider from its site, Blizzard threatened suit while MDY commenced
legal action “seeking a declaration that Glider does not infringe
Blizzard’s copyright or other rights.”20 Blizzard asserted
counterclaims for “contributory and vicarious copyright
infringement, violation of DMCA [Digital Millennium Copyright
Act] §§ 1201(a)(2) and (b)(1), and tortious interference with

11. Id. at 935.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 936. Blizzard’s EULA and ToU were subsequently changed to make clear
that “cheats, automation software (bots), hacks, mods or any other unauthorized third-party
software designed to modify the World of Warcraft experience” are prohibited. World of
Warcraft End User License Agreement, supra note 3; World of Warcraft Terms of Use,
BLIZZARD ENTM’T, http://us.blizzard.com/en-us/company/legal/wow_tou.html (last
updated Dec. 9, 2010).
15. MDY, 629 F.3d at 936.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 936–37.
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contract.”21 DMCA § 1201(a)(2) provides penalties for providing a
product that circumvents technology that controls access to a
copyrighted work.22 Similarly, § 1201(b)(1) prohibits providing a
product that circumvents technology designed to protect the rights
of a copyright owner.23
The district court granted partial summary judgment to Blizzard,
finding that MDY was liable for contributory and vicarious copyright
infringement, as well as tortious interference with Blizzard’s
contracts.24 The district court granted MDY partial summary
judgment only on the issue of whether MDY violated DMCA §
1201(a)(2) by accessing WoW’s source code.25 Following a bench
trial, the district court ultimately found MDY liable for violating
Section 1201(a)(2), because it circumvented Blizzard’s Warden

21. Id. at 937.
22. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (2006). The full text of the statute provides:
No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise
traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof,
that—
(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this
title;
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to
circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work
protected under this title; or
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that person with
that person's knowledge for use in circumventing a technological measure that
effectively controls access to a work protected under this title.
Id.
23. Id. § 1201(b)(1). The full text of the statute provides:
No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise
traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof,
that—
(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing protection
afforded by a technological measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright
owner under this title in a work or a portion thereof;
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to
circumvent protection afforded by a technological measure that effectively protects a
right of a copyright owner under this title in a work or a portion thereof; or
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that person with
that person's knowledge for use in circumventing protection afforded by a
technological measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under
this title in a work or a portion thereof.
Id.
24. MDY, 629 F.3d at 937.
25. Id.
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technology, and liable for violating Section 1201(b)(1).26
Consequently, the court held Donnelly personally liable for $6.5
million in damages.27
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT OPINION
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed on the issues of
contributory and vicarious copyright infringement and liability under
DMCA § 1201(b)(1).28 However, MDY was still found to be liable
under DMCA § 1201(a)(2).29 The court did not decide the issue of
tortious interference, but vacated the district court’s grant of
summary judgment because there were issues of material fact that
needed to be considered.30
The court began its analysis by first considering the copyright
infringement claims.31 MDY stipulated that if WoW users violated
Blizzard’s copyright by installing and using Glider, MDY would be
liable for contributory and vicarious infringement.32 As part of its
analysis, the court first determined whether WoW players owned the
game or merely licensed it from Blizzard.33 Based on a recent test
that the Ninth Circuit used in Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc.,34 the court in
MDY concluded that WoW players are licensees rather than
owners.35 Because of this, WoW users were not eligible for the
“essential step” defense that could protect their use of the game.36
After determining that Glider users were licensees, the court
examined whether violating the license agreement constituted
copyright infringement.
26. Id. at 937, 943.
27. Id. at 937.
28. Id. at 958.
29. Id.
30. See id.
31. Id. at 937.
32. Id. at 938.
33. Id.
34. 621 F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[A] software user is a licensee rather than
an owner of a copy where the copyright owner (1) specifies that the user is granted a license;
(2) significantly restricts the user’s ability to transfer the software; and (3) imposes notable use
restrictions.”). The problematic nature of this test is taken up in Part IV.A.
35. MDY, 629 F.3d at 938.
36. Id. at 939. By contrast, if WoW players were owners of the software, they would not
be liable for copyright infringement where they made the copy as an “essential step” in using
the software (i.e., copying the software into a computer’s RAM before playing the game). Id.
at 938.

465

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

3/20/2012 11:38 AM

2012

Under Ninth Circuit precedent, a licensee who acts outside of
the license agreement may be liable for copyright infringement.37 To
ascertain this, the Ninth Circuit applied Delaware law38 to determine
whether the term in the EULA and ToU that prohibited bots was a
“condition” of the license agreement or a “covenant.”39 While the
two seem indistinguishable on their face, the ultimate effects of
either classification are vastly different. Breaching a condition of a
license agreement constitutes copyright infringement, with its
accompanying statutory damages, while violating a covenant of a
license results in an action for breach of contract, in which recovery
is limited to actual damages.40
To distinguish the two provisions in a license agreement, the
Ninth Circuit defined a covenant as “a contractual promise, i.e., a
manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a particular
way, such that the promisee is justified in understanding that the
promisor has made a commitment.”41 On the other hand, a
condition falls under a narrower class that encompasses “an act or
event that must occur before a duty to perform a promise arises.”42
Stated another way, a breach of a license agreement results in liability
for copyright infringement where “(1) the copying [] exceed[s] the
scope of the defendant’s license and (2) the copyright owner’s
complaint [is] grounded in an exclusive right of copyright.”43
Applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit determined that Blizzard’s
prohibition on bots was a covenant and, consequently, Glider users
did not infringe Blizzard’s copyrights.44 Based on this holding, the
Ninth Circuit also held that MDY was not liable to Blizzard for
contributory or vicarious infringement.45
After addressing the copyright infringement claims, the court
addressed Blizzard’s claims under the DMCA regarding MDY’s

37. See id. at 939.
38. Delaware law was applied here because Blizzard’s EULA and ToU “provide that
they are to be interpreted according to Delaware law.” Id.
39. Id. at 939–40.
40. Id. at 941 n.3.
41. Id. at 939.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 940.
44. Id. at 941.
45. Id. at 941–42. The court’s misguided application of the condition/covenant
distinction is addressed in Part IV.B.
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circumvention of Blizzard’s Warden technology.46 The court noted
that the purposes of the DMCA are to protect copyright owners and
“mitigate the problems presented by copyright enforcement in the
digital age.”47 As mentioned above, DMCA §§ 1201(a)(2) and
(b)(1) prohibit trafficking in technology that circumvents
technological protections.48 Section 1201(a)(2) prohibits bypassing a
technological measure that controls access to a copyrighted work
while Section 1201(b)(1) prevents bypassing protection that a
technological measure provides to rights of a copyright owner.49
While at first glance the textual differences between these two
sections appear small, the court relied heavily on these small
differences. The court used these differences as the basis for some
legal gymnastics to conclude that Section 1201(a)(2) focuses on
access to a copyrighted work, which is not a traditional right
protected by copyright law, while Section 1201(b)(1) addresses
traditional copyright protections for “reproduction, distribution,
public performance, public display, and creation of derivative
works.”50
In arriving at these conclusions, the Ninth Circuit rejected
Federal Circuit precedent by deciding that a violation of Section
1201(a)(2) did not require that the circumventing device actually
facilitate copyright infringement.51 Based on the court’s
interpretation of these DMCA provisions, it held that MDY did not
violate Section 1201(b)(1), but that it was liable under Section
1201(a)(2).52 The end result of the Ninth Circuit’s decision was to
reverse MDY’s liability for copyright infringement, but paradoxically,
to hold MDY liable for violating the DMCA anti-circumvention
statute when no copyright infringement had occurred.

46. MDY, 629 F.3d at 942.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), (b)(1) (2006). For the full text of these statutes, see supra
notes 22, 23.
50. MDY, 629 F.3d at 944.
51. Id. at 950.
52. Id. at 954–55. The dangerous precedent and purposeful circuit split created by the
Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the DMCA is addressed in Part IV.C.
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IV. ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in MDY illustrates that it favors the
interests of copyright holders over those of software users and
developers. Each main holding in the case has this bias and
undermines one of the key purposes of copyright law: to balance
copyright protections while not deterring “artistic creation for the
betterment of society.”53 This Part analyzes each of those holdings
and discusses where the Ninth Circuit went wrong.
A. Purchasing Physical Media Without Owning It
One of the key issues in MDY was whether players of WoW
actually owned copies of the game, or whether they were only using
them under a license from Blizzard. In this case, the outcome of that
issue determined whether the “essential step” defense could be
invoked by users who ran Glider, and consequently whether they
could be classified as copyright infringers.54
Prior to MDY, the Ninth Circuit held in Mai Systems Corp. v.
Peak Computer, Inc. that running a program by copying it into a
computer’s RAM constituted making a copy of the program for
purposes of copyright infringement.55 Congress had previously
responded to concerns that anybody using a computer could be
considered a copyright infringer by creating the “essential step”
exception, which generally allows an owner of copyrighted work to
make a copy of that work where doing so is an “essential step” in
using the product.56 However, in Mai the Ninth Circuit nonetheless
held that computer repair persons were liable for copyright
infringement when they turned on a computer because the computer
created a copy of the operating system as it was loaded into RAM
and the repair persons were not the owners of the copyrighted
material.57 After the Ninth Circuit’s debacle, however, Congress was

53. See Kelly Cochran, Facing the Music: Remixing Copyright Law in the Digital Age, 20
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 312, 320 (2011).
54. MDY, 629 F.3d at 938.
55. 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993).
56. 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) (2006); see also Bill Hinsee, Wrath of the EULA: Can the Use
of Bots Lead to Copyright Infringement?, 17 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 160, 163 (2011).
57. See Mai, 991 F.2d at 517–19.
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more explicit and specifically exempted computer repair people from
copyright infringement when repairing a computer.58
Although the “essential step” exception resolved some of the
confusion over making copies to run a program, the exception still
generally applies only to “owners.” In this case, because the users
physically purchased a CD to run WoW, it could have been simple
for the Ninth Circuit to declare that the users owned the individual
copies of the CD and its software. However, the Ninth Circuit
instead chose to continue to apply bad principles by using its
controversial test articulated in Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc.59
In Vernor, the Ninth Circuit held “that a software user is a
licensee rather than an owner of a copy where the copyright owner
(1) specifies that the user is granted a license; (2) significantly
restricts the user’s ability to transfer the software; and (3) imposes
notable use restrictions.”60 The Vernor test is so easy to meet that it
severely weakened the value of the “first sale” doctrine, which
generally precludes liability for copyright infringement for resale of a
copy of a work where the person actually owns that copy.61 After
Vernor, virtually every person who purchases a copy of software no
longer owns that software, but is a licensee instead. The Vernor test
has thus been justly criticized as “drastically shift[ing] the rights of
downstream consumers back to copyright holders, severely damaging
a century’s worth of rights balancing which promotes restraints on
alienation and the demise of secondary media markets.”62 In MDY,
the Ninth Circuit could have overturned or limited Vernor without
causing much difficulty because it had not been around long enough
to garner substantial reliance. However, by upholding Vernor, the
court once again affirmed its new course toward protecting copyright

58. 17 U.S.C. § 117(c).
59. 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Touching
and Concerning Copyright: Real Property Reasoning in MDY Industries, Inc. v. Blizzard
Entertainment, Inc., 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1063, 1078–79 (2011) (“To reach [its]
conclusion, the Ninth Circuit followed its own controversial logic from Vernor v. Autodesk, in
effect allowing the copyright holder to impose, via EULAs and ToUs, servitudes that restrain
the otherwise permissible, ‘ordinary’ behavior of users in lawful possession of copies of
copyrighted works.”).
60. Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1111.
61. Marcelo Halpern, Yury Kapgan & Kathy Yu, Vernor v. Autodesk: Software and the
First Sale Doctrine Under Copyright Law, 23 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 7, 7 (2011).
62. David A. Costa, Vernor v. Autodesk: An Erosion of First Sale Rights, 38 RUTGERS L.
REC. 213, 213 (2010).
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holders at the expense of software purchasers and traditional
copyright doctrines.
Another problem with the Ninth Circuit’s distinction between
licensing and ownership is that it does not reflect market
perceptions. “[C]onsumers naturally feel that purchasing a given
product should confer ownership and allow for freedom in that
product’s disposition.”63 Many WoW users would likely be surprised
to hear that the CD that they purchased at the store is actually the
property of Blizzard Entertainment. While consumer desires and
perceptions should not dictate the law, they do show how far distant
the Ninth Circuit’s view of copyright is from reflecting the realities
of marketplace perceptions.
B. Covenants, Conditions, and Confusion
The Ninth Circuit in MDY claimed to follow precedent when it
determined that violating the license agreement was a breach of
contract rather than copyright infringement.64 The court applied a
test based on a distinction between covenants and conditions, where
a breach of a condition of a license agreement constituted copyright
infringement while a breach of a covenant limited liability to breach
of contract damages. However, in applying this test, the court
improperly stretched precedent to fit a particular policy result, which
ended up creating an unworkable and unpredictable test for future
cases.
One commentator has pointed out that the major distinction
between breach of contract and copyright law is that copyright law is
ultimately an enforcement of property rights.65 To make copyright
infringement depend on violation of a condition rather than a
covenant does not make sense because property rights are already
defined by copyright law and are unchanged by a license, which
merely defines authorization and access to certain property rights.
Viewing the Ninth Circuit’s covenants/conditions test in this light
illustrates that all the test accomplishes is that it determines whether
someone committed copyright infringement by reference to whether
63. Michael V. Sardina, Exhaustion and First Sale in Intellectual Property, 51 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 1055, 1056 (2011).
64. MDY Indus., Inc. v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 939 (9th Cir. 2010),
amended by 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 3428 (9th Cir. 2011).
65. Raymond T. Nimmer, Copyright First Sale and the Over-Riding Role of Contract, 51
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1311, 1311 (2011).
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they actually violated the copyright (and lacked authorization to do
so). By creating such a simplistic test and packaging it in terms of
whether licensing provisions are covenants or conditions, the Ninth
Circuit has injected unnecessary confusion and complexity into
copyright law.
Another commentator, Dennis Karjala, has strongly criticized the
Ninth Circuit’s covenant/condition distinction.66 He argues that
such an approach is “incompatible with true licenses that are
negotiated between knowledgeable parties, which often condition
the continuation of the license on compliance with promises that
have nothing to do with the exclusive rights of the copyright
owner.”67
Karjala raises two good points that warrant further elaboration.
First, giving software licensing agreements with consumers the same
force as a true licensing agreement—one between sophisticated
merchants—does not make sense. Boilerplate, one-size-fits-all
agreements are generally one-sided, and while enforceable under
ProCD,68 courts should treat them with caution, knowing that the
consumer is already the vulnerable party. Further, consumers are
extremely unlikely to have read software licensing agreements. While
this is not an excuse to avoid enforcing all license agreements, this
general trend ought to give courts some hesitation when trying to
split hairs between whether a term is a condition or covenant.
Second, if conditions truly warrant treating software licensing
agreements as “true licenses” (or if courts are determined to take
that position), then there is no reason to make any distinction
between covenants and conditions at all. If parties are being treated
as knowingly agreeing to the terms of the license, those terms should
govern in their entirety. For example, Blizzard’s EULA states that
“[a]ny use of the Game in violation of the License Limitations will
be regarded as an infringement of Blizzard’s copyrights in and to the
Game.”69 While it seems illogical to hold inexperienced consumers
absolutely to such licensing agreements, if courts are to treat
consumers as knowledgeable licensees then they ought to be willing
to fully support freedom of contract by enforcing any violation of the
66. Dennis S. Karjala, Protecting Innovation in Computer Software, Biotechnology, and
Nanotechnology, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 42, 61 n.93 (2011).
67. Id.
68. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996).
69. World of Warcraft End User License Agreement, supra note 3.
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licensing agreement as a copyright violation. Rather than taking
either this position or recognizing the problems with enforcing
licensing agreements against consumers, the Ninth Circuit in MDY
has perpetuated a legal fiction with its current test. This legal fiction
undermines the freedom to contract, creates uncertainty, and only
offers meager protection to consumers who are unlikely to be aware
of licensing terms or to understand which terms are linked with
copyright infringement.
C. DMCA Anti-Circumvention Liability Without Copyright
Infringement
Perhaps the most damaging precedent that the Ninth Circuit
created in MDY was to hold MDY liable under the DMCA anticircumvention provisions even though it was not liable for copyright
infringement.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision to hold MDY liable under these
provisions contradicts the superior approach taken by other courts.70
Those courts “hold that only circumvention that supports copyright
infringement is prohibited.”71 For example, in Chamberlain Inc. v.
Skylink Technologies, Inc., the Federal Circuit was presented with a
case where a garage door opener manufacturer had installed a
“rolling code” program for its transmitters that would regularly
change the code needed to open the garage door.72 Skylink, a
manufacturer of universal transmitters, bypassed the “rolling code”
to allow its transmitters to work with Chamberlain’s garage door
openers.73 Chamberlain sued Skylink, alleging violations of the anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA.74 To prevent a possible
DMCA interpretation that would “grant manufacturers broad
exemptions from both the antitrust laws and the doctrine of
copyright misuse,” the Federal Circuit declared that the DMCA anticircumvention provisions “do not establish a new property right”

70. Stephen McJohn, Top Tens in 2010: Copyright and Trade Secret Cases, 9 NW. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 325, 332 (2011).
71. Id. (citing MGE UPS Sys. v. GE Consumer & Indus. Inc., 622 F.3d 361 (5th Cir.
2010); Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng’g & Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d 1307
(Fed. Cir. 2005); Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Tech., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1203 (Fed.
Cir. 2004)).
72. Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1183.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1185.
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and “simply provide property owners with new ways to secure their
property.”75 Consistent with this approach, the court held that the
DMCA provisions “prohibit[] only forms of access that bear a
reasonable relationship to the protections that the Copyright Act
otherwise affords copyright owners.”76
The position taken by the Federal Circuit appears to be the most
logical approach to applying these DMCA provisions. It prevents
abuse of copyright law by limiting the scope of DMCA liability so
that copyright holders are not equipped with weapons that extend
beyond the protections that traditional copyright law affords, while
retaining those traditional protections. The Ninth Circuit reached a
result that has potential for abuse by overzealous copyright holders
who can now threaten or sue others under the DMCA, even though
there is no copyright violation.77 And rather than ignoring Federal
Circuit precedent, the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected the better
approach offered in Chamberlain on this issue, creating an
unnecessary circuit split.78
Another problem with the Ninth Circuit’s DMCA analysis is that
it is inconsistent with the underlying purposes of the DMCA and
copyright law. The court recognized that the DMCA exists to
“conform United States copyright law to its obligations under two
World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) treaties, which
require contracting parties to provide effective legal remedies against
the circumvention of protective technological measures used by
copyright owners.”79 However, the court failed to take account of
the broader purposes of copyright law, which have been summarized
by scholars as protecting authors’ ownership of their works alongside
75. Id. at 1192–94.
76. Id. at 1201.
77. Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit was unwilling to adopt an “infringement nexus”
requirement for DMCA violations while it required “that for a licensee’s violation of a contract
to constitute copyright infringement, there must be a nexus between the condition and the
licensor’s exclusive rights of copyright.” MDY Indus., Inc. v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d
928, 941, 950 (9th Cir. 2010), amended by 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 3428 (9th Cir. 2011)
(emphasis added).
78. Id. at 950 (“While we appreciate the policy considerations expressed by the Federal
Circuit in Chamberlain, we are unable to follow its approach.”). But see Raymond Nimmer,
Ninth Circuit Rejects Chamberlain, Places DMCA Back on a Proper Track, 16 CYBERSPACE L.
21, 21 (2011) (“The Ninth Circuit, in MDY . . . expressly rejects Chamberlain, returning the
statute to its intended purpose—creating a right to protect controls on access to works in
digital contexts.”).
79. MDY, 629 F.3d at 942.
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encouraging “artistic creation for the betterment of society”80 or
“provid[ing] just enough incentive to prompt the creation of new
works.”81 These purposes would justify allowing noninfringing
innovative products, such as Glider, particularly where such products
do not harm demand for the original product.82 By ignoring the
larger context of copyright law, the Ninth Circuit reached the
untenable conclusion that MDY was liable for circumventing Warden
even though MDY and all other Glider users were not liable for
copyright infringement. Instead of furthering the purposes and
consistency of copyright law, the Ninth Circuit created an
unnecessary circuit split, adopted bad policy, and added new
protections for copyright holders at the expense of innovation and
artistic creation.
V. CONCLUSION
In MDY, the Ninth Circuit sent a strong and clear message from
Blizzard and other game owners to future software developers:
“Keep your program out of my game.” At the expense of innovation
and clarity in copyright law, the court reaffirmed the controversial
Vernor test delineating whether a software purchaser is an owner or a
licensee. Further, the court inconsistently applied an already
confusing standard for copyright infringement involving conditions
and covenants. In addition, it created a new circuit split in order to
protect a previously nonexistent right of copyright holders to enforce
the DMCA anti-circumvention provision against software developers
that do not even engage in copyright infringement.
The Ninth Circuit’s slant in favor of copyright holders at the
expense of software purchasers and innovative software developers is
evident throughout MDY. If the Ninth Circuit continues on its
misguided path through copyright law, Congress or the Supreme
Court will need to step in and restore the balance of interests

80. Cochran, supra note 53, at 320.
81. Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 889,
905 (2011) (emphasis added).
82. The parties in MDY disputed whether Glider harmed Blizzard’s revenues, and the
court did not decide the issue. MDY, 629 F.3d at 939. It is entirely possible that Glider
increased Blizzard’s revenues.

474

DO NOT DELETE

423

3/20/2012 11:38 AM

Keep Your Program Out of My Game

between copyright holders, software purchasers, and innovative
developers.
Brandon T. Crowther

. J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University.
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